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is always somewhat difficult to evaluate because of the want of any
other existing work in the field to compare it with. This is because
the first available volume is apt to be either uncritically praised as a
monumental effort, the best in its field (a safe statement when there
is no other), or hypercritically taken to task for an inability to solve
or suggest viable solutions for all of the complex problems and
questions which the authors profess to see. On balance this reviewer will go on record as recommending the volume to practitioners engaged in the field of condominium. It adequately
covers the basic concepts and furnishes reference material not
otherwise readily available. It does at the very least encourage
one to think positively about the workability of the condominium
concept (as the authors obviously do) and it will provide in its
text discussion, its copious footnotes, and the compendium of forms,
enough suggestions, comments, and examples to furnish real inspiration and assistance to the practitioner called upon to represent
the developer, the buyer or the association of owners of a condominium project.
GILBERT H. HENNESSEY, JR.*
THIS HONORABLE COURT:
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Leo Pfeffer, constitutional lawyer and legal scholar, professor
of political science and would-be historian, has written a history
of the Supreme Court which will annoy the specialist, regardless
of the mantle he wears. In the splinterized academia no one could
hope to satisfy all of the specialists all of the time, but one would
expect that Pfeffer could satisfy some of them some of the time.
To the criticism that the author was writing for the general reader
and not for an academic audience,1 this reviewer can only respond
that with Pfeffer's impressive credentials the general reader deserves
a better book. What the reader did receive is essentially a rehash
of Supreme Court decisions, mixed with some uneven history and
2
biography spiced with a sprinkling of personal judgment.
* B.S. 1938, J.D. 1940, University of Illinois. Member of the Illinois bar.
t Professor of Political Science, Long Island University, New York.
I See Cherrington, Book Review, 79 HARV. L. REv. 227 (1965), in which the volume
is appraised as useful and interesting for the lay reader.
2The book contains an index of cases cited, but no footnotes and only a highly
selective, briefly annotated bibliography.
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In evaluating this volume, four considerations suggest themselves: the author's treatment of the Court as a political body; his
use and abuse of history; Pfeffer's analysis of the relationship between public opinion and decisions of the Court; and his evaluation
of the more prominent justices.
Though the Court is the highest American judicial tribunal
and though it seems to operate with legal instruments within a legal
context, in reality Pfeffer contends, it has become "a third branch
of the political government, exercising vast powers and influencing
our political, social and economic society. ' 3 In this characterization
Pfeffer the political scientist predominates over Pfeffer the lawyer,
as he blithely disposes of the essential legal and constitutional
questions at the threshold of a legal study. The author acknowledges
that his approach leads to a seeming paradox: a Supreme Court,
without self-sufficient enforcement power, making significant political and legislative decisions, but then escaping effective political
attack. Perhaps there is some value in a political approach to the
subject, but if it is to be determined one must probe beneath the
level of the superficial and the obvious. An investigation of the
political considerations .surrounding the appointment of various
justices and an analysis of their political views and predispositions
would be in order. But Pfeffer has done this only to a limited degree; his treatment tending to highlight the unevenness of the
available secondary material. From an analytical standpoint if the
justices are to be viewed as political beings, should they not be
evaluated in terms of the politician? At the core of political success
is a flexibility of mind and a willingness to compromise personal
beliefs in order to secure the support of a majority. Using this
standard, it would seem that the greatest justices should be those
who were willing to trim their views in an effort to produce judicial
harmony. Should the dissenter be the hero Supreme Court historians have made of the first Harlan, Holmes, Brandeis, Black and
Douglas, or should the hero be a Taft who desperately sought
unanimity?
Though this politically-oriented approach runs through the
book, the story is presented chronologically and is intended to be
a history of the Court. To throw light upon the paradox posed at
the outset, Pfeffer seeks to develop what he calls a "life history" of
3 PFEFFER, THis HONORABLE COURT

20 (1965).
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the Court, an examination of the decisions of the Court "against
the political, social and economic background which gave rise to
its major decisions and which in turn was vitally affected by these
decisions." 4 This is a worthy aim, for even with the recent spate of
volumes dealing with the Supreme Court, much fundamental
work in placing the Court in a more generalized historical setting
remains to be done. This leads to our second consideration, the
author's use and abuse of history.
Pfeffer's inclusion of history is little beyond the minimum required to make the Court's decisions themselves comprehensible.
His use of historical data is cursory and oversimplified, and at
times inaccurate. On the first page of the text, seeking to dramatize
the widespread effect of Supreme Court decisions, the author states
that the millions of Americans who filed income tax returns for 1894
were relieved of this burden by the Pollock decision in 1895.5
Pfeffer's search for drama has led him into careless error, for
only those with income in excess of $3500 were required to file, and
in the depression year of 1894 it is unlikely that any more than a
quarter of a million Americans were so affected. This is the author's
most egregious error, though his implication that Cuba was annexed following the Spanish-American War runs a close second.
Certain of his other historical judgments are highly questionable,
such as his view that the Dred Scott decision 6 made the Civil War inevitable, or that Thaddeus Stevens has been subject to more vilification than any American since Benedict Arnold, or that William
Randolph Hearst's yellow journalism was almost single-handedly
responsible for the declaration of war upon Spain, or that a modus
vivendi could have been worked out between Russia and the
United States if Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's planned trip to the Soviet
Union had not been frustrated.
Beyond these particular problems involving the use of historical data, Pfeffer's research into the available material is too
limited to produce valuable results. We want to know why justices
were appointed, what forces operated upon their decision-making,
what effect these decisions had upon the public, and finally what
effect such public reaction in turn had upon the justices. The book
I Ibid.
r Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
ODred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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does make some assertions in these areas, but it is largely devoid
of evidence upon which to evaluate them.
Pfeffer attempts to explain the paradox he poses by stating that
the Court has survived, and even increased its stature, by its consistent ability to reflect the popular will-the collective conscience
of the community. This gives rise to the third consideration. The
author empathizes with the Court in its task of reflecting the attitudes and expectations of the American people. He contends that
in the Supreme Court as on the baseball field there is no practical
difference between the score of 5 to 4 and 9 to 0. Apparently entrapped by this superficial analogy, Pfeffer too often accepts the
final result without concern for the score.
The successful, though not always popular Court, argues Pfeffer,
has been the one which has mirrored successfully the demands of
the times. Of Marshall's many important decisions, only Gibbons
v. Ogden1 engendered substantial popular support, but the author
sees Marshall's reputation resting upon his recognition of the tide
of American economic evolution. He views the decisions in the
Slaughter-House Cases8 and Munn v. Illinois9 as attempts to inhibit
business, attempts which were doomed to failure in an environment of industrial growth and business dominance. But even in
this tendency to read the Court's decisions with vague references
to the economic, social and political environment the author is not
consistent. Error is inevitable when one works too little with historical facts and too much with historical generalities. For example,
if one seeks to rationalize the Court's decisions by a reference to
prevailing conditions and attitudes, such a technique should be
applicable to decisions restricting the effectiveness of Reconstruction legislation, but clearly, except for a decided minority, the
American people have been, until recently, apathetic to Negro
equality.
Pfeffer, often speculative and unconvincing, sees the Warren
Court in the period from 1958 to 1959 backing away from the
rationale and implications of its early liberalism in areas of communism and individual rights. Because the results of the 1955-56
decisions seem different from those of the later period, the author
concludes that the justices reacted to the public criticism their
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
- 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
'94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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earlier decisions engendered. 10 He does not analyze divisions on
the Court, nor particular votes, nor the nature and substance of the
public criticism directed toward the Court.
In time of fear and stress when critics ask much of the Court,
Pfeffer argues that the Court alone cannot stem the tide of an excited and emotionally-charged popular will. His admonition seems
to be: ask not from the Court what you cannot expect to get from
a popular majority. With such an understanding Pfeffer excuses
the Court for its decisions against civil liberties in the World War
II and McCarthy eras. "For the Court to attempt to speak reason
to an irrational people," he writes, "would not have been merely
quixotic, it would probably have been suicidal."" Only within
the author's emotional treatment of the early 1950's and his inclination to apologize for the decisions of the Court can such a
judgment be understood.
In considering the fourth factor in our review-Pfeffer's evaluation of the justices-we reach an area in which Pfeffer has met with
some success. He has given the reader an understanding of the
office as well as an insight into some of the one hundred men who
have donned the robes of a Supreme Court justice. Their sensitivity
has had to endure the public attacks that began as early as 1794
when the first cries of impeachment were heard. Absence of
political reprisals has not meant the absence of bitter criticism for
justices. Pfeffer gives the reader some understanding of the human
dimension of these men: their physical infirmities and, at times,
their mental deficiencies, which caused difficulties both within and
without the Court; their background and, at times, their personal
prejudices; and finally their ability, in most cases, to grow and develop in meeting the responsibilities of their high office.
Pfeffer's treatment of the more prominent justices is quite interesting. In evaluating John Marshall, Pfeffer tries the approach
that many historians have tried with Lincoln, i.e., emphasizing the
man's professional shortcomings and his personal limitations, but
meeting with the same result-that no matter what the criticism, the
man's influence and stature remain great. As an interpretative
10 Pfeffer reaches his conclusion by comparing Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956) with Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) and Beilan v. Board of
Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) with
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956) with Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
11
PFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 377.
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device the author defines Marshall's implied aim as one of making
the Supreme Court a strong and independent force within the
government which could withstand popular pressure, concluding
that just such a Court has evolved. This attenuated attempt to
bring some unity to his story distorts the material, for Pfeffer himself hints that Marshall, because of his eloquent defense of private
property, would see such a result as more of a nightmare than the
achievement of his true dream.
On the subject of Roger Taney, Pfeffer subscribes to the now
prevalent historical tendency to rehabilitate the justice tainted by
the Dred Scott decision by calling attention to his aid in developing
the police power concept. Pfeffer laments Hughes' decision to
leave the Court for a presidential bid in 1916, feeling that a long,
uninterrupted tenure would have made Hughes a greater justice.
Though noting the shortcomings of the Taft Court, the author
praises Taft for charting a new course in the protection of individual liberties. Though treating both kindly, the author clearly
distinguishes the work of Holmes and Brandeis. He speculates that
perhaps the traditional evaulation of each man's significant contribution should be reversed-with Holmes being primarily recognized for economic jurisprudence and Brandeis for his defense of
civil liberties. While recognizing that a different Vinson might
have had a profound impact upon the Court's decisions in the
early 1950's, Pfeffer excuses decisions restricting the political rights
of the individual by a reference to a "great sickness" of the American people, which he defines as a loss of rationality in the face of an
assumed communist menace. 12 With Shelley v. Kraemer'3 Pfeffer
discerns a trend in the Vinson Court toward protection of the Negro
in his search for equality, but which was an honor the Warren
Court was to reap. Discussing the Warren Court, the author becomes cautious in his judgments, and he is more reportorial than
analytical.
In conclusion, two points of criticism require further discussion.
First, Pfeffer fails to deliver what his introduction promises, for his
limited analytical tools quickly become dull and unproductive.
The paradox which he states in his first chapter grows rather than
diminishes with his presentation. Just how has the Court been
able to escape effective attack while making significant political
12
13

Id. at 363-64.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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and economic decisions? Or to rephrase the question, why have
Americans given their continued support to this least democratic
branch of the Federal government? Is it simply tradition, or an
inherent suspicion of majority power, or even a desire to maintain
a whipping boy upon which to vent aggressions in a changing world?
Pfeffer's only answer seems to be that the Court has succeeded because it has reflected popular will. We are, however, confronted
with gaps between the judicial decisions and the majority will.
For instance, the attack on the Court as a protector of vested
property interests was launched in earnest some thirty years before
the famous 1937 revolution. To explain this frustration which a
pragmatic people endure, we must recognize the American's reverence for, and his search for security in, the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has sustained and strengthened its role because its
welfare is inseparably linked to the Constitution itself. Whether we
choose to call this myth or not, the Court's invulnerability rests upon
the popularly-held belief that it is interpreting a Constitution freed
from the common political pressures. How else can we explain the
public apathy to Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan in 1937?
Second, Pfeffer's defense of the Court and his apology for its
decisions leads him to criticize his own liberal position. Actually
Pfeffer fails to meet the liberal contention that a democracy true
to itself must allow the expression of unpopular opinions, even
when the demand for conformity and unanimity is greatest. Certainly it is a truism to state that neither a court nor a constitution
can save a people bent on destruction, but is it not the Court's duty
to speak reason and caution even to an aroused people? The author
sees the Warren Court doing-just this in the middle 1950's, but at
that time Pfeffer concludes such a course was feasible, while during
the prior McCarthy era it was not. But why not? Pfeffer seems
mired in a view of historical inevitability, leading him to conclude
that such leadership was not assumed earlier because it could
not have been assumed earlier. We have advanced beyond the early
definition of democracy as the rule of the majority to the position
that democracy now must also include the protection of certain
basic rights which even a concerted majority may not infringe.
Without direct involvement by the courts a minority, whatever its
character, is often without effective protection. It is not surprising
that the author has ignored this argument, for his thesis leads to the
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conclusion that we cannot expect any more from the Supreme Court
than we can from any other political branch of the government.
Even as a most practical matter, one must still ask if this conclusion
is sound?
JOHN E. SEMONCHE*
* A.B., Brown University, 1954; M.A. 1955, Ph.D. 1962, Northwestern University.
Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

